Republic
of the Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No.
71381 November 24, 1986
THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CONSTANTINO
PECARDAL, accused-appellant.
Renato U.
Galimba for accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant
stands convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide and has been
sentenced to life imprisonment. 1
He asks us to reverse the decision of the trial court because
his constitutional rights have been violated.
The victim of the offense
was a taxi driver whose body was found in the luggage compartment of
his vehicle in the morning of May 27, 1982. He had been stabbed
twenty three times with a balisong that had later been left on
the dashboard of the car. Apparently, Rogelio Florendo had also been
robbed for no money was found on his person or in the taxicab.
It was two months later
when the accused-appellant was picked up by the police and questioned
in connection with the crime. As a result, an information for the
said offense was filed against him and his unidentified co-accused,
who was then at large and so was not tried with him.
2
According to the
prosecution, Pecardal and his companion boarded the victim's taxicab
at about 1 o'clock in the morning of May 27, 1982, and thereafter
held him up. When he resisted, they stabbed him in different parts of
the body and killed him. They then divested him of his money in the
amount of P200.00, placed his body in the luggage compartment of the
car, which they drove to and abandoned inYakal Street, Project 3,
Amihan, Quezon City. There it was discovered with its grisly occupant
that same morning by a barangay tanod. 3
Presented as prosecution
witnesses were the victim's wife, Concepcion Florendo, who testified
on the civil damages; 4
Dr. Gregorio Blanco, who performed the autopsy on the victim's body;
5
Pat. Teodoro Ybuan, and one of the two policemen who invited"
the accused-appellant for investigation.
6
This last witness and
Pat. Ernesto Daria declared in a joint affidavit that Pecardal "when
questioned readily admitted his participation in the fatal stabbing
of victim ROGELIO LORENDO after robbing him of his daily earnings
amounting to P200.00; and named EDUARDO AZARCON as his partner in the
commission of the said offense.
7
They said they thereafter
turned over the accused-appellant to the Quezon City Police
Headquarters, where he signed a statement confessing his guilt. The
statement described in detail how the offense was committed and was
marked as Exhibit "H" at the trial. 8
Significantly, however, it was never specifically offered in evidence
by the prosecution.
The prosecution made much
of this confession and argued it could not have been made except by
the actual perpetrator of the crime because of its detailed
narration. Moreover, it had been given by the accused-appellant
voluntarily, after he had been apprised of his constitutional rights.
9
The accused-appellant
took the stand in his defense mainly to denounce this confession. He
testified on the physical punishment inflicted on him by the police
investigators that ultimately forced him to sign the statement which
he said had been prepared unilaterally by them. 10
This testimony was not rebutted.
In the decision
convicting the accused-appellant, 11
the trial judge relied strongly, if not almost mainly, on this
confession. This is strange because, to repeat, that piece of
evidence was never formally offered by the prosecution or, for that
matter even the defense.
This document should
never have been considered at all because of Rule 132, Section 35, of
the Rules of Court providing as follows:
Sec.35. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
According to Moran, "the
offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his
findings of facts and his judgmentonly and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties at the trial." 12
In his demurrer to the
evidence, the accused-appellant stressed the failure of the
prosecution to present this confession, 13
but the prosecutor simply said it was part of its strategy and left
it at that. 14
Despite all this, the
trial judge referred in his decision to Exhibit "H" as the
confession and considered it sufficient basis for the conviction of
the accused. As a matter of fact, Exhibit" H " was not the
confession but the Police Referral of the case to the City Fiscal of
Quezon City dated July 22, 1982. 15
But even assuming that
the supposed confession had been formally offered in evidence, we
would have to reject it just the same because it violates Section 20,
Article IV, of the1973 Constitution.
The undisputed evidence
is that the confession was obtained without according to the
accused-appellant the right to counsel and after he had been
subjected to physical compulsion and maltreatment.
If there was really an
interrogation of the accused, the notification of his constitutional
rights by the investigating officer was perfunctory and pro forma,
intended obviously merely to satisfy the prescribed norms through a
recitation by note of the sacramental advise. 16
Although he was
supposedly informed of his right to counsel, he was not told he could
get one if he so desired or that one could be provided him at his
request. It is a matter of record that the interrogation was made in
the absence of counsel de parte or de oficio, and that
the waiver of counsel, if made at all was not made with the
assistance of counsel as required. 17
It is true that the
original requirement laid down in Morales v. Enrile 18
was not supported by the majority of eight required by the
Constitution. Nonetheless, the doctrine announced therein was later
affirmed in People v. Galit, 19
with fourteen members of the Court voting in favor and only one not
taking part. The same rule was only recently reiterated in the case
of People v. Sison, 20
decided last May.
Besides the lack of
counsel, there was the violence the accused claimed was inflicted
upon him by the police. According to him, he was undressed, boxed,
kicked, hit in the back with a rattan chair, and electric-shocked. 21
Finally, unable to bear the punishment any longer, he agreed to sign
the prepared confession which he was not allowed to read.
22
The prosecution did not introduce any witness to refute these
allegations.
Surely, a confession
obtained under these circumstances cannot stand if we are to obey the
mandate of the Constitution, as we must.
It is argued, however,
that the accused-appellant orally admitted to Pat. Ybuan and Pat
Daria that he had killed and robbed Florendo. This admission was
made, according to the two policemen in their joint affidavit, after
they apprehended the accused-appellant and started questioning him.
While Pat Ybuan testified
that he informed the suspect of his constitutional rights at the time
of his arrest, there is no record that the admission was made by him
in the presence of counsel, or that he had previously waived counsel.
Additionally, even
assuming that the accused-appellant was not yet under custodial
investigation at the time and that the requirements of Section 20
were not yet applicable, there is still the question of the
credibility of these two policemen.
One may suppose that in
an excess of zeal the peace officers might have colored their
statement to insure the accused-appellant's conviction. In any event,
it is their word against that of the accused-appellant, who disavowed
the admission. 23
When the evidence for the
prosecution and the evidence for the accused are weighed, the scales
must be tipped in favor of the latter. This is because of the
constitutional presumption of innocence the accused enjoys as a
counterfoil to the awesome authority of the State that is prosecuting
him. 24
The element of doubt, if
reasonable as in this case, must operate against the inference of
guilt the prosecution would draw from its evidence. That evidence,as
it happens, consists only of the uncorroborated statement of the two
policemen which, as previously observed, is flawed and therefore
suspect.
The confession which
could have corroborated them was not formally offered by the
prosecution. In any case, it is void because it was obtained without
the advice or even the presence of counsel, besides having been
vitiated by force and threats.
The Solicitor General
strongly argues that the supposed confession could not have been made
by any one except the perpetrator of the offense because its
commission was described in minute detail. Perhaps so. On the other
hand, it could have been the work of a creative imagination that
concocted all the said details to make a plausible tale against the
accused-appellant. The doubt, which we cannot brush aside, is there.
We note that at the time
the accused-appellant was apprehended and interrogated, he was only
seventeen years old. That is a susceptible age. One can accept how
easily a teenager can succumb to the pressure exerted upon him by
hardened investigators experienced in extracting confessions through
the use of methods less than legal. That pressure was in this case
irresistible.
A life has been taken and
justice demands that the wrong be redressed. But the same justice
that calls for retribution cannot convict the prisoner at bar whose
guilt has not been proved. Justitia est duplex, viz., severe
puniens et vere praeveniens. Even as this Court must punish, so
too must it protect, Conceivably, the conviction of the
accused-appellant could add another victim in this case.
WHEREFORE, the appealed
decision is REVERSED and the accused-appellant ACQUITTED, with costs
de oficio. It is so ordered.
Yap
(Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
#
Footnotes
1 Rollo, P. 25.
2 Orig. Rec., p. 1.
3 Rollo, p. 20.
4 TSN, March 17, 1983, pp. 5-6.
5 TSN, May 10, 1983, pp. 3-12.
6 TSN, May 10, 1983, pp. 12-15; TSN, May 26, 1983, pp.
3-18.
7 Exhibit "G."
8 Orig. Rec., p. 143.
9 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, pp. 9-10.
10 TSN, May 24, 1984, p. 2; TSN, May 31, 1984, pp. 1-2;
TSN, June 19, 1984, pp. 1-2.
11 Rollo, pp. 19-25.
12 6 Moran p. 120 citing US vs. Solano, 33 Phil 582 and
Dayrit vs. Gonzales, 7 Phil. 182.
13 Rollo, p. 94.
14 Ibid, p. 101.
15 See List of Exhibits.
16 Signed statement of accused Constantino Pecardal p.
1.
17 Brief for the Accused-Appellant, pp. 18-19.
18 121 SCRA 538.
19 135 SCRA 465.
20 G.R. No. 70906.
21 TSN, May 24, 1984. p. 2; TSN, May 31, 1984, p. 1.
22 TSN, May 31, 1984, p. 2; TSN, June 19, 1984, pp.
1-2.
23 Supra.
24 Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution; People vs.
Opida, G.R. No. L-46272, June 13, 1986.
The
Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
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71381_11_24_86_footnotes