I.
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
REAL PROPERTY UNDER PAR NO. 1; LANDS, BUILDINGS, ROADS AND
CONSTRUCTIONS OF ALL KINDS ADHERING TO THE SOIL
A
BUILDING IS ALWAYS IMMOVABLE
While
it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the
building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the
building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of
what may constitute real properties could mean only one thing —
that a building is by itself an immovable property (cf. Leung Yee v.
Strong Machinery). In the absence of any specific provision of law to
the contrary, a building is an immovable property, irrespective of
whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to
belong to the same owner.
Prudential
Bank v. Panis
Building
separate and distinct from the land
In the enumeration of properties under Article 415 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, it is obvious that the inclusion of 'building' separate and distinct from the land, in said provision of law can only mean that a building is by itself an immovable property.
In the enumeration of properties under Article 415 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, it is obvious that the inclusion of 'building' separate and distinct from the land, in said provision of law can only mean that a building is by itself an immovable property.
Leung
Yee v. Strong Machinery
Building
separate from land does not affect character as real property;
Registry of chattel mortgage does not affect character of the
building and the machineries installed therein
The Chattel Mortgage Law contemplates and makes provision for mortgages of personal property; and the sole purpose and object of the chattel mortgage registry is to provide for the registry of "Chattel mortgages," mortgages of personal property executed in the manner and form prescribed in the statute. The building of strong materials in which the machinery was installed was real property, and the mere fact that the parties seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as real property. It follows that neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage registry of the instrument purporting to be a chattel mortgage of the building and the machinery installed therein, nor the annotation in that registry of the sale of the mortgaged property, had any effect whatever so far as the building was concerned.
The Chattel Mortgage Law contemplates and makes provision for mortgages of personal property; and the sole purpose and object of the chattel mortgage registry is to provide for the registry of "Chattel mortgages," mortgages of personal property executed in the manner and form prescribed in the statute. The building of strong materials in which the machinery was installed was real property, and the mere fact that the parties seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as real property. It follows that neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage registry of the instrument purporting to be a chattel mortgage of the building and the machinery installed therein, nor the annotation in that registry of the sale of the mortgaged property, had any effect whatever so far as the building was concerned.
BUILDING
IS IMMOVABLE BY INCORPORATION
Bicerra
v. Teneza
House
is immovable property even if situated on land belonging to a
different owner; Exception, when demolished
A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the soil on which it is built (Article 415, paragraph 1, Civil Code). This classification holds true regardless of the fact that the house may be situated on land belonging to a different owner. But once the house is demolished, as in this case, it ceases to exist as such and hence its character as an immovable likewise ceases.
A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the soil on which it is built (Article 415, paragraph 1, Civil Code). This classification holds true regardless of the fact that the house may be situated on land belonging to a different owner. But once the house is demolished, as in this case, it ceases to exist as such and hence its character as an immovable likewise ceases.
BUILDING
ON RENTED LAND IS STILL IMMOVABLE
Evangelista
v. Alto Surety
House
is not personal, but immovable property
The house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit or other personal property not capable of manual delivery, but immovable property. As explicitly held, in Laddera vs. Hodges (48 OG 5374), "a true building (not merely superimposed on the soil) is immovable or real property, whether it is erected by the owner of the land or by a usufructuary or lessee. This is the doctrine in Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Company, 37 Phil., 644. The opinion that the house of Rivera should have been attached in accordance with subsection (c) of said section 7, as "personal property capable of manual delivery, by taking and safely keeping in his custody", for it declared that "Evangelista could not have validly purchased Ricardo Rivera's house from the sheriff as the latter was not in possession thereof at the time he sold it at a public auction” is untenable.
The house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit or other personal property not capable of manual delivery, but immovable property. As explicitly held, in Laddera vs. Hodges (48 OG 5374), "a true building (not merely superimposed on the soil) is immovable or real property, whether it is erected by the owner of the land or by a usufructuary or lessee. This is the doctrine in Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Company, 37 Phil., 644. The opinion that the house of Rivera should have been attached in accordance with subsection (c) of said section 7, as "personal property capable of manual delivery, by taking and safely keeping in his custody", for it declared that "Evangelista could not have validly purchased Ricardo Rivera's house from the sheriff as the latter was not in possession thereof at the time he sold it at a public auction” is untenable.
House
may be considered personal property in a deed of chattel mortgage,
but view is limited to parties
Parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal property for purposes of said contract (Luna vs. Encarnacion, 48 OOG 2664; Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil., 630; De Jesus vs. Juan Dee Co., Inc., 72 Phil., 464). However, this view is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. It is based, partly, upon the principle of estoppel. Neither this principle, nor said view, is applicable to strangers to said contract.
Parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal property for purposes of said contract (Luna vs. Encarnacion, 48 OOG 2664; Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil., 630; De Jesus vs. Juan Dee Co., Inc., 72 Phil., 464). However, this view is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. It is based, partly, upon the principle of estoppel. Neither this principle, nor said view, is applicable to strangers to said contract.
INSTANCES
WHERE BUILDING IS TREATED AS PERSONAL BY THE PARTIES
GENERAL
TEST, OF “MOVABLE” CHARACTER
Stadard
Oil v. Jamarillo
Jaramillo,
register of deeds, does not have judicial or quasi-judicial power to
determine nature of document registered as chattel mortgage
Section 198 of the Administrative Code, originally of Section 15 of the Chattel Mortgage Law (Act 1508 as amended by Act 2496), does not confer upon the register of deeds any authority whatever in respect to the "qualification," as the term is used in Spanish law, of chattel mortgages. His duties in respect to such instruments are ministerial only. The efficacy of the act of recording a chattel mortgage consists in the fact that it operates as constructive notice of the existence of the contract, and the legal effects of the contract must be discovered in the instrument itself in relation with the fact of notice. Registration adds nothing to the instrument, considered as a source of title, and affects nobody's rights except as a species of notice. Thus, it is duty for the register of deed to accept the proper fee and place the instrument on record, as his duties in respect to the registration of chattel mortgages are of a purely ministerial character; and no provision of law can be cited which confers upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the nature of any document of which registration is sought as a chattel mortgage.
It may be noted that in an administrative ruling by James Ostrand, Judge of the fourth branch of CFI Manila (9th Judicial District) and later Supreme Court Justice, provided the same position that the Register of Deeds has no authority to pass upon the capacity of the parties to a chattel mortgage which is presented to him for record. The issue where the chattel mortgage is held ineffective against third parties as the mortgaged property is real instead of personal is a question determine by the courts of justice and mot by the register of deeds.
Section 198 of the Administrative Code, originally of Section 15 of the Chattel Mortgage Law (Act 1508 as amended by Act 2496), does not confer upon the register of deeds any authority whatever in respect to the "qualification," as the term is used in Spanish law, of chattel mortgages. His duties in respect to such instruments are ministerial only. The efficacy of the act of recording a chattel mortgage consists in the fact that it operates as constructive notice of the existence of the contract, and the legal effects of the contract must be discovered in the instrument itself in relation with the fact of notice. Registration adds nothing to the instrument, considered as a source of title, and affects nobody's rights except as a species of notice. Thus, it is duty for the register of deed to accept the proper fee and place the instrument on record, as his duties in respect to the registration of chattel mortgages are of a purely ministerial character; and no provision of law can be cited which confers upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the nature of any document of which registration is sought as a chattel mortgage.
It may be noted that in an administrative ruling by James Ostrand, Judge of the fourth branch of CFI Manila (9th Judicial District) and later Supreme Court Justice, provided the same position that the Register of Deeds has no authority to pass upon the capacity of the parties to a chattel mortgage which is presented to him for record. The issue where the chattel mortgage is held ineffective against third parties as the mortgaged property is real instead of personal is a question determine by the courts of justice and mot by the register of deeds.
Issue
whether interest is in nature of real property not relevant to the
issue of placing the document on record in Chattel Mortgage
In Leung Yee vs. Frank L. Strong Machinery, the Supreme Court held that where the interest conveyed is of the nature of real property, the placing of the document on record in the chattel mortgage register is a futile act. That decision is not decisive of the question before the Supreme Court, which has reference to the function of the register of deeds in placing the document on record.
In Leung Yee vs. Frank L. Strong Machinery, the Supreme Court held that where the interest conveyed is of the nature of real property, the placing of the document on record in the chattel mortgage register is a futile act. That decision is not decisive of the question before the Supreme Court, which has reference to the function of the register of deeds in placing the document on record.
CONSTRUCTION
OF ALL KINDS ADHERED TO THE SOIL
Board
of Assessment Appeals v. City Treasurer
Steel
towers are not immovable property under paragraph 1, 3 and 5
The steel towers or supports do not come within the objects mentioned in paragraph 1, because they do not constitute buildings or constructions adhered to the soil. They are not constructions analogous to buildings nor adhering to the soil. As per description, given by the lower court, they are removable and merely attached to a square metal frame by means of bolts, which when unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from place to place.
The steel towers or supports do not come within the objects mentioned in paragraph 1, because they do not constitute buildings or constructions adhered to the soil. They are not constructions analogous to buildings nor adhering to the soil. As per description, given by the lower court, they are removable and merely attached to a square metal frame by means of bolts, which when unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from place to place.
They can not be included under paragraph 3, as they are not attached
to an immovable in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without
breaking the material or causing deterioration upon the object to
which they are attached. Each of these steel towers or supports
consists of steel bars or metal strips, joined together by means of
bolts, which can be disassembled by unscrewing the bolts and
reassembled by screwing the same.
These steel towers or supports do not also fall under paragraph 5,
for they are not machineries or receptacles, instruments or
implements, and even if they were, they are not intended for industry
or works on the land. Petitioner is not engaged in an industry or
works on the land in which the steel supports or towers are
constructed.
REAL
PROPERTY UNDER NO. 2: TREES, PLANTS AND GROWING FRUITS.
TREES
AND PLANTS
Sibal
v. Valdez
Paragraph
2, Article 334 of the Civil Code interpreted by the Tribunal Supremo
de Espana as that growing crops may be considered as personal
property
Sugar
cane may come under the classification of real property as
"ungathered products" in paragraph 2 of article 334 of the
Civil Code, which enumerates as real property as "Trees, plants,
and ungathered products, while they are annexed to the land or form
an integral part of any immovable property." That article,
however, has received in recent years an interpretation by the
Tribunal Supremo de España, which holds that, under certain
conditions, growing crops may be considered as personal property.
(Decision of March 18, 1904, vol. 97, Civil Jurisprudence of Spain.)
Thus, under Spanish authorities, pending fruits and ungathered
products may be sold and transferred as personal property. Also, the
Supreme Court of Spain, in a case of ejectment of a lessee of an
agricultural land, held that the lessee was entitled to gather the
Products corresponding to the agricultural year because said fruits
did not go with the land but belonged separately to the lessee. And
further, under the Spanish Mortgage Law of 1909, as amended, the
mortgage of a piece of land does not include the fruits and products
existing thereon, unless the contract expressly provides otherwise.
REAL
PROPERTY UNDER NO. 3: EVERYTHING ATTACHED TO AN IMMOVABLE IN A FIXED
MANNER
ATTACHMENT
MUST BE IN A FIXED MANNER
Board
of Assessment Appeals v. City Treasurer
Steel
towers are not immovable property under paragraph 1, 3 and 5
They
can not be included under paragraph 3, as they are not attached to an
immovable in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without
breaking the material or causing deterioration upon the object to
which they are attached. Each of these steel towers or supports
consists of steel bars or metal strips, joined together by means of
bolts, which can be disassembled by unscrewing the bolts and
reassembled by screwing the same.
REAL
PROPERTY UNDER NO. 5: MACHINERIES, RECEPTACLES, INSTRUMENTS OR
IMPLEMENTS
THEY
MUST BE DESTINED FOR USE IN THE INDUSTRY OR WORK
MOVABLES
MUST BE PLACED BY THE OWNER
Ago
v. CA
Sawmill
machineries and equipment are real properties in accordance with Art.
415 (5)
By reason of installment in a building, the said sawmill machineries and equipments became real estate properties in accordance with the provision of Art. 415(5) of the Civil Code. It is interpreted similarly to the case of Berkenkotter vs. Cu Unjieng e Hijos, where the Court held that the installation of the machinery and equipment in the central of the Mabalacat Sugar Company for use in connection with the industry carried by that company, converted the said machinery and equipment into real estate by reason of their purpose. In the present case, the installation of the sawmill machineries in the building of the Golden Pacific Sawmill, Inc., for use in the sawing of logs carried on in said building, the same became a necessary and permanent part of the building or real estate on which the same was constructed, converting the said machineries and equipments into real estate within the meaning of Article 415(5) of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
By reason of installment in a building, the said sawmill machineries and equipments became real estate properties in accordance with the provision of Art. 415(5) of the Civil Code. It is interpreted similarly to the case of Berkenkotter vs. Cu Unjieng e Hijos, where the Court held that the installation of the machinery and equipment in the central of the Mabalacat Sugar Company for use in connection with the industry carried by that company, converted the said machinery and equipment into real estate by reason of their purpose. In the present case, the installation of the sawmill machineries in the building of the Golden Pacific Sawmill, Inc., for use in the sawing of logs carried on in said building, the same became a necessary and permanent part of the building or real estate on which the same was constructed, converting the said machineries and equipments into real estate within the meaning of Article 415(5) of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Davao
Sawmill v. Castillo
Movables
must be placed by the owner
Standard
Oil ruling key to issue on the character of the property
It must be pointed out that Davao Sawmill should have registered its protest before or at the time of the sale of this property. It must further be pointed out that while not conclusive, the characterization of the property as chattels by Davao Sawmill is indicative of intention and impresses upon the property the character determined by the parties. In this connection the decision of the court in the case of Standard Oil vs. Jaramillo, whether obiter dicta or not, furnishes the key to such a situation.
It must be pointed out that Davao Sawmill should have registered its protest before or at the time of the sale of this property. It must further be pointed out that while not conclusive, the characterization of the property as chattels by Davao Sawmill is indicative of intention and impresses upon the property the character determined by the parties. In this connection the decision of the court in the case of Standard Oil vs. Jaramillo, whether obiter dicta or not, furnishes the key to such a situation.
Immobilization
of machinery; when placed in plant by owner
Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. The distinction rests upon the fact that one only having a temporary right to the possession or enjoyment of property is not presumed by the law to have applied movable property belonging to him so as to deprive him of it by causing it by an act of immobilization to become the property of another.
Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. The distinction rests upon the fact that one only having a temporary right to the possession or enjoyment of property is not presumed by the law to have applied movable property belonging to him so as to deprive him of it by causing it by an act of immobilization to become the property of another.
APPLICATION
OF THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL
Serg’s
Products v. PCI Leasing
Machinery
immovable properties by incorporation
The machinery were essential and principal elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of them was movable or personal property on its own, all of them have become "immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry." The machines are thus, real, not personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.
The machinery were essential and principal elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of them was movable or personal property on its own, all of them have become "immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry." The machines are thus, real, not personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.
Parties
estopped when parties stipulated properties as personal; property
thus subject to writ of seizure
Contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material
Contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material
fact found therein. Thus, said machines are proper subjects of the
Writ of Seizure
Third
parties acting in good faith not affected by stipulation to consider
real property as personal
The holding that the machines should be deemed personal property pursuant to the Lease Agreement is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. Hence, while the parties are bound by the Agreement, third persons acting in good faith are not affected by its stipulation characterizing the subject machinery as personal. In the present case, however, there is no showing that any specific third party would be adversely affected.
The holding that the machines should be deemed personal property pursuant to the Lease Agreement is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. Hence, while the parties are bound by the Agreement, third persons acting in good faith are not affected by its stipulation characterizing the subject machinery as personal. In the present case, however, there is no showing that any specific third party would be adversely affected.
REAL
PROPERTY UNDER NO. 10
Hongkong
& Shanghai Banking v. Aldecoa & Co.
Court
has jurisdiction as bank does not seek to exercise mortgage right on
real properties in the provinces
The bank is not seeking to exercise its mortgage rights upon the mortgages which the defendant firm holds upon certain real properties in the Provinces of Albay and Ambos Camarines and to sell these properties at public auction in these proceedings; nor does the judgment of the trial court directs that this be done. Before that property can be sold the original mortgagors will have to be made parties. The bank is not trying to foreclose any mortgages on real property executed by Aldecoa & Co.
The bank is not seeking to exercise its mortgage rights upon the mortgages which the defendant firm holds upon certain real properties in the Provinces of Albay and Ambos Camarines and to sell these properties at public auction in these proceedings; nor does the judgment of the trial court directs that this be done. Before that property can be sold the original mortgagors will have to be made parties. The bank is not trying to foreclose any mortgages on real property executed by Aldecoa & Co.
CONCEPT
OF REAL PROPERTY IN REAL PROPERTY TAXES
Meralco
vs CBAA
Pipeline
means a line of pipe connected to pumps, valves and control devices
for conveying liquids, gases or finely divided solids. It is a line
of pipe running upon or in the earth, carrying with it the right to
the use of the soil in which it is placed.
Article
415[l] and [3] provides that real property may consist
of constructions
of all kinds adhered to the soil and
everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way
that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material
or deterioration of the object.
The pipeline system in question is indubitably a construction
adhering to the soil. It is attached to the land in such a way that
it cannot be separated therefrom without dismantling the steel pipes
which were welded to form the pipeline.
Insofar as the pipeline uses valves, pumps and control devices to
maintain the flow of oil, it is in a sense machinery within the
meaning of the Real Property Tax Code.
II.
MOVABLE PROPERTY
PERSONAL
PROPERTY UNDER NO. ART. 416 (1): "NOT INCLUDED IN ART. 415."
Involuntary
insolvency of Paul Strochecker v. Ramirez
Interest
in business may be subject of mortgage
With regard to the nature of the property mortgaged which is one-half interest in the business, such interest is a personal property capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties in articles 335 of the Civil Code, and may be the subject of mortgage. All personal property may be mortgaged. (Sec. 7, Act 1508.)
With regard to the nature of the property mortgaged which is one-half interest in the business, such interest is a personal property capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties in articles 335 of the Civil Code, and may be the subject of mortgage. All personal property may be mortgaged. (Sec. 7, Act 1508.)
PERSONAL
PROPERTY UNDER ART. 416 (2): "BY SPECIAL PROVISION OF LAW."
Sibal
v. Valdez
Chattel
Mortgage Law recognizes growing crops as personal property
Act 1508, the Chattel Mortgage Law, fully recognizes that growing crops are personal property. Section 2 of said Act provides that "All personal property shall be subject to mortgage, agreeably to the provisions of this Act, and a mortgage executed in pursuance thereof shall be termed a chattel mortgage." Section 7 in part provides that "If growing crops be mortgaged the mortgage may contain an agreement stipulating that the mortgagor binds himself properly to tend. care for and protect the crop while growing." The above provisions of Act 1508 were enacted on the assumption that "growing crops" are personal property.
Act 1508, the Chattel Mortgage Law, fully recognizes that growing crops are personal property. Section 2 of said Act provides that "All personal property shall be subject to mortgage, agreeably to the provisions of this Act, and a mortgage executed in pursuance thereof shall be termed a chattel mortgage." Section 7 in part provides that "If growing crops be mortgaged the mortgage may contain an agreement stipulating that the mortgagor binds himself properly to tend. care for and protect the crop while growing." The above provisions of Act 1508 were enacted on the assumption that "growing crops" are personal property.
PERSONAL
PROPERTY UNDER ART. 416 (3): "FORCES OF NATURE."
US
v. Carlos
While
electrivity is not fluid, still its manifestations and effects like
those of gas may be felt and seen. The true test of what may be
stolen is not whether it is corporeal ro incorporeal, but whether,
being poessed of value, a person other than the owner, may
appropirate the same. Electrcity like gas, is a valuable merchandise,
and may thus be stolen.
PERSONAL
PROPERTY UNDER ART. 416 (4): "CAN BE TRANSPORTED FROM PLACE TO
PLACE."
Philippine
Refining v. Jarque
Vessels
are personal property under civil and common law
Vessels are considered personal property under the civil law. (Code of Commerce, article 585.) Similarly under the common law, vessels are personal property. Under the common law, vessels are personal property although occasionally referred to as a peculiar kind of personal property.
Vessels are considered personal property under the civil law. (Code of Commerce, article 585.) Similarly under the common law, vessels are personal property. Under the common law, vessels are personal property although occasionally referred to as a peculiar kind of personal property.
PERSONAL
PROPERTY UNDER ART. 417 (2): "SHARES OF STOCKS."
Chua
Guan v. Samahang Magsasaka
A
share of stock in a gold mining corporation is personal property; bu
the gold mine itself, as well as any land of the corporation, is
regarded as real
property
by the law. The certificate itself evidencing the ownership of the
share, as well as the share itself, is regarded as personal property.
Being personal it can be subject of chattel mortgage.
IIi.
PROPERTY
IN RELATION TO THE PERSON TO WHOM IT BELONGS (ARTS. 419-426)
PUBLIC
DOMINION AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
Republic
v. CA
Classification
of property as either of public dominion or of private ownership;
Public lands / public dominion
Property, which includes parcels of land found in Philippine territory, is either of public dominion or of private ownership. Public lands, or those of public dominion, have been described as those which, under existing legislation are not the subject of private ownership, and are reserved for public purposes. The New Civil Code enumerates properties of public dominion in Articles 420 and 502 thereof. Article 420 includes “those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and “those which belong to the State without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" as property belonging to public dominion. Article 502 adds "rivers and their natural beds;” “continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds and the beds themselves;” “waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public dominion;” and “ lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands and their beds;” to the enumeration.
Property, which includes parcels of land found in Philippine territory, is either of public dominion or of private ownership. Public lands, or those of public dominion, have been described as those which, under existing legislation are not the subject of private ownership, and are reserved for public purposes. The New Civil Code enumerates properties of public dominion in Articles 420 and 502 thereof. Article 420 includes “those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and “those which belong to the State without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" as property belonging to public dominion. Article 502 adds "rivers and their natural beds;” “continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds and the beds themselves;” “waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public dominion;” and “ lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands and their beds;” to the enumeration.
Extent
of a lake bed
The extent of a lake bed is defined in Artcile 74 of the Law of Waters of 1866, as “the natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth."
The extent of a lake bed is defined in Artcile 74 of the Law of Waters of 1866, as “the natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth."
Highest
Ordinary Depth in a lake; Determinant is rainfall and not
gravitational pull (tides)
The phrase "highest ordinary depth" has been interpreted in the case of Government. vs. Colegio de San Jose to be the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season, such depth being the "regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the year; or thus rain "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from different sources." While the waters of a lake are also subject to the same gravitational forces that cause the formation of tides in seas and oceans, this phenomenon is not a regular daily occurrence in the case of lakes. The alternation of high tides and low tides, which is an ordinary occurrence, could hardly account for the rise in the water level of the Laguna de Bay as observed 4-5 months a year during the rainy season; rather, it is the rains which bring about the inundation of a portion of the land in question. Since the rise in the water level which causes the submersion of the land occurs during a shorter period than the level of the water at which the land is completely dry, the latter should be considered as the "highest ordinary depth" of Laguna de Bay. The land sought to be registered, therefore, is not part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay.
The phrase "highest ordinary depth" has been interpreted in the case of Government. vs. Colegio de San Jose to be the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season, such depth being the "regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the year; or thus rain "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from different sources." While the waters of a lake are also subject to the same gravitational forces that cause the formation of tides in seas and oceans, this phenomenon is not a regular daily occurrence in the case of lakes. The alternation of high tides and low tides, which is an ordinary occurrence, could hardly account for the rise in the water level of the Laguna de Bay as observed 4-5 months a year during the rainy season; rather, it is the rains which bring about the inundation of a portion of the land in question. Since the rise in the water level which causes the submersion of the land occurs during a shorter period than the level of the water at which the land is completely dry, the latter should be considered as the "highest ordinary depth" of Laguna de Bay. The land sought to be registered, therefore, is not part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay.
Foreshore
land defined; Definition does not apply to land adjacent to
lake
Foreshore land is that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides; or the strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. In the present case, since the inundation of a portion of the land near the lake is not due to “flux and reflux of tides,” it thus cannot be considered a foreshore land within the meaning cited by the Director of Lands.
Foreshore land is that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides; or the strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. In the present case, since the inundation of a portion of the land near the lake is not due to “flux and reflux of tides,” it thus cannot be considered a foreshore land within the meaning cited by the Director of Lands.
Purpose
of land registration under Torrens System
The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which applicant already possesses over the land. Registration under the Torrens Law was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. Applicant in this case asserts ownership over the parcel of land he seeks to register and traces the roots of his title to a public instrument of sale in favor of his father from whom he
The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which applicant already possesses over the land. Registration under the Torrens Law was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. Applicant in this case asserts ownership over the parcel of land he seeks to register and traces the roots of his title to a public instrument of sale in favor of his father from whom he
inherited said land.
Tax
declaration strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription;
also Open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse
possession of the land
Applicant presents tax declarations covering the land since 1918 and also tax receipts dating back to 1948. While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. Further, applicant by himself and through his father before him, has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed land for more than 30 years, counted from 19 April 1909, when the land was acquired from a third person by purchase. Since applicant has possessed the subject parcel in the concept of owner with just title and in good faith, his possession need only last for ten years in order for ordinary acquisitive prescription to set in. Applicant has more than satisfied this legal requirement.
Applicant presents tax declarations covering the land since 1918 and also tax receipts dating back to 1948. While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. Further, applicant by himself and through his father before him, has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed land for more than 30 years, counted from 19 April 1909, when the land was acquired from a third person by purchase. Since applicant has possessed the subject parcel in the concept of owner with just title and in good faith, his possession need only last for ten years in order for ordinary acquisitive prescription to set in. Applicant has more than satisfied this legal requirement.
Judicial
confirmation of imperfect title
Even if the land sought to be registered is public land, applicant would be entitled to a judicial confirmation of his imperfect title, since he has also satisfied the requirements of the Public Land Act (CA 141 as amended by RA 1942). Section 48 of the Act enumerates as among the persons entitled to judicial confirmation of imperfect title, such as “those who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under bona fide claim of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title."
Even if the land sought to be registered is public land, applicant would be entitled to a judicial confirmation of his imperfect title, since he has also satisfied the requirements of the Public Land Act (CA 141 as amended by RA 1942). Section 48 of the Act enumerates as among the persons entitled to judicial confirmation of imperfect title, such as “those who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under bona fide claim of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title."
Reclamation
requires proper permission; reclaimed land does not automatically
belong to party reclaiming the same
Private persons cannot, by themselves reclaim land from water bodies belonging to the public domain without proper permission from government authorities. And even if such reclamation had been authorized, the reclaimed land does not automatically belong to the party reclaiming the same as they may still be subject to the terms of the authority earlier granted. In the present case, private oppositors-petitioners failed to show proper authority for the alleged reclamation, therefore, their claimed title to the litigated parcel must fall.
Private persons cannot, by themselves reclaim land from water bodies belonging to the public domain without proper permission from government authorities. And even if such reclamation had been authorized, the reclaimed land does not automatically belong to the party reclaiming the same as they may still be subject to the terms of the authority earlier granted. In the present case, private oppositors-petitioners failed to show proper authority for the alleged reclamation, therefore, their claimed title to the litigated parcel must fall.
Tolerance
of possession cannot ripen into ownership
As the private oppositors-petitioners entered into possession of the land with the permission of, and as tenants of, the applicant del Rio; the fact that some of them at one time or another did not pay rent. Their use of the land and their non-payment of rents thereon were merely tolerated by applicant and these could not have affected the character of the latter's possession which has already ripened into ownership at the time of the filing of this application for registration. Only possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as the root of a title acquired by prescription.
As the private oppositors-petitioners entered into possession of the land with the permission of, and as tenants of, the applicant del Rio; the fact that some of them at one time or another did not pay rent. Their use of the land and their non-payment of rents thereon were merely tolerated by applicant and these could not have affected the character of the latter's possession which has already ripened into ownership at the time of the filing of this application for registration. Only possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as the root of a title acquired by prescription.
CHARACTERISTICS
OF PROPERTIES OF PUBLIC DOMINION.
Vda.
De Tantoco v. Muncipal Council of Iloilo
Property
of public domain applies to municipal property for public use; both
not within the commerce of man
The principle governing property of the public domain of the State is applicable to property for public use of the municipalities as said municipal property is similar in character. The principle is that the property for public use of the State is not within the commerce of man and, consequently, is unalienable and not subject to prescription. Likewise, property for public use of the municipality is not within the commerce of man so long as it is used by the public and, consequently, said property is also inalienable.
The principle governing property of the public domain of the State is applicable to property for public use of the municipalities as said municipal property is similar in character. The principle is that the property for public use of the State is not within the commerce of man and, consequently, is unalienable and not subject to prescription. Likewise, property for public use of the municipality is not within the commerce of man so long as it is used by the public and, consequently, said property is also inalienable.
CONVERSION
OF PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMINION TO PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY.
Cebu
Oxygen & Acetylene v. Bercilles
Street
withdrawn from public use becomes patrimonial property; Subsequent
sale valid
When a portion of the city street was withdrawn from public use, such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract. As expressly provided by Article 422 of the Civil Code, "property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." Further, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu, in very clear and unequivocal terms, states that "property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed." Thus, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid.
When a portion of the city street was withdrawn from public use, such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract. As expressly provided by Article 422 of the Civil Code, "property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." Further, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu, in very clear and unequivocal terms, states that "property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed." Thus, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid.