EN BANC
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ,
respondents.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship
of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of
the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member
of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen."
Respondent Cruz
was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The
fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.
On November 5, 1985, however,
respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and,
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath
of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4),
a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others,
"rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed
forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost.
-- A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the
following ways and/or events:
x x x
(4) By rendering services to, or
accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country:
Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such
commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking
of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his
Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is
present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has
a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign
country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains
armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic
of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at
the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission,
and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he
does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country;
And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering
service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign
country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or
(b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election
of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service
to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his
discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be
automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and
political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding
his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization
as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in
the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17,
1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected
as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May
11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes
over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for
reelection.
Subsequently,
petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that
respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required
under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision dismissing the
petition for quo warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the duly
elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the
May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27,
2000.
Petitioner thus filed the present
petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the
following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors
and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction,
when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in
view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors
and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction,
when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines
despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his Philippine
citizenship.
3. Assuming
that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was
invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed
the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not
legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status.
The issue now before us is whether
respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz
may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his
Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States
in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists
that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly states that
natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends
that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen when he was
repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV,
Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of
being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who
are Filipino citizens as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the
Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are
citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973
of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority, and
There are two
ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to
the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the
naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a
citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.
As defined in the same Constitution,
natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
his Philippine citizenship."
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become
Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law
(Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an
applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino
citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes
executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the
court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant
has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a
lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any
offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4)
committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or
contrary to any Government announced policies.
Filipino
citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the
same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A.
No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine
citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473,
as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for
reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act
No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications
and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by
those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed
forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World
War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5)
political and economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy
process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking
of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where
the person concerned resides or last resided.
xxx.
Parenthetically, under these statutes referring to RA Nos. 965 and
2630, the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would
not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had
to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the
place of his residence or where he had last resided in the
Philippines. Italics in the original.
Moreover,
repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will
be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen.
On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before
he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his
Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of
the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his
Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired
United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he
resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of
allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus
taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan
in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is
deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him
torecover, or return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent
Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an
act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained
by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen"
was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution
as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one
who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person
to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen
from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or
perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973
Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino
citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were
naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine
citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not
considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipinos at
birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship.
Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they
also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now
considers those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are
natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence:
"Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are
considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the
enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that
there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are
natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with
law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have
to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is
the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons
who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it.
The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either
be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss
of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law
for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required
by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire
his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he
possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of
the House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be
the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the House. The Court's
jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. In the
absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute
the Court's judgment for that of the latter for the simple reason
that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire
into the correctness of the assailed decision. There is no such
showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED.