EN BANC
[G.R. No. 89914. November 20, 1991.]
JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO
TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE MILLS JR., LEONARDO GAMBOA, KURT
BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ, ERNESTO CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON,
SUSAN ROXAS, ELVIE CASTILLO, and CYNTHIA SABIDO LIMJAP, petitioners,
vs. THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by
and through the CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, respondents, JOSE S.
SANDEJAS, intervenor.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala,
Pecson & Bengson for petitioners.
Balgos & Perez for intervening
petitioner.
Eddie Tamondong and Antonio T. Tagaro
for respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PADILLA, J p:
This is a petition for prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
injunctive relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce
evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six
(36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations.
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with the
Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled
"Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez, et al.", for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages.
The complaint was amended several times
by impleading new defendants and or amplifying the allegations
therein. Under the Second Amended Complaint, 1 the herein petitioners
were impleaded as party defendants.
The complaint insofar as pertinent to
herein petitioners, as defendants, alleges among others that:
"14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy)
Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by themselves and/or
in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their relationship, influence
and connection with the latter Defendant spouses, engaged in devices,
schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense
of Plaintiff and the Filipino people, among others:
(a) obtained, with the active
collaboration of Defendants Senen J. Gabaldon, Mario D. Camacho,
Mamerto Nepomuceno, Carlos J. Valdez, Cesar C. Zalamea and Francisco
Tantuico, Atty. Jose Bengzon, Jr. and his law partners, namely:
Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose Vicente E. Jimenez, Amando V.
Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz; Jose S. Sandejas and his fellow
senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings groups of companies such as
Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Abelardo S.
Termulo, Rex C. Drilon II and Kurt Bachmann, Jr., control of some of
the biggest business enterprises in the Philippines, such as the
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), Benguet Consolidated Mining
Corporation (BENGUET), Pilipinas Shell Corporation and the Philippine
Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank) by employing devious
financial schemes and techniques calculated to require the massive
infusion and hemorrhage of government funds with minimum or
negligible 'cashout' from Defendant Benjamin Romualdez. . . .
xxx xxx
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(m) manipulated, with the support,
assistance and collaboration of Philguarantee officials led by
chairman Cesar E.A. Virata and the senior managers of FMMC/PNI
Holdings, Inc. led by Jose S. Sandejas, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon and
Kurt S. Bachmann, Jr., among others, the formation of Erectors
Holdings, Inc. without infusing additional capital solely for the
purpose of Erectors Incorporated with Philguarantee in the amount of
P527,387,440.71 with insufficient securities/collaterals just to
enable Erectors Inc. to appear viable and to borrow more capitals, so
much so that its obligation with Philguarantee has reached a total of
more than P2 Billion as of June 30, 1987.
(n) at the onset of the present
Administration and/or within the week following the February 1986
People's Revolution, in conspiracy with, support, assistance and
collaboration of the abovenamed lawyers of the Bengzon Law Offices,
or specifically Defendants Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Jose V.E. Jimenez,
Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr. manipulated,
schemed, and/or executed a series of devices intended to conceal and
place, and/or for the purpose of concealing and placing, beyond the
inquiry and jurisdiction of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) herein Defendants' individual and collective funds,
properties, and assets subject of and/or suited in the instant
Complaint.
(o) maneuvered, with the technical
know-how and legalistic talents of the FMMC senior managers and some
of the Bengzon law partners, such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr.,
Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Amando V. Faustino, Jose Vicente E.
Jimenez and Leonardo C. Cruz, the purported sale of defendant
Benjamin Romualdez's interests in the (i) Professional Managers,
Inc., (ii) A & E International Corporation (A & E), (iii)
First Manila Management Corporation (FMMC), (iv) Maguindanao
Navigation (MNI), (v) SOLOIL, Inc. (SOLOIL), (vi) Philippine World
Travel Inc. (PWTI) and its subsidiaries consisting of 36 corporations
in all, to PNI Holdings, Inc. (whose purported incorporators are all
members of Atty. Jose F S. Bengzon's law firm) for only P5 million on
March 3, 1986 or three days after the creation of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government on February 28, 1986, for the sole
purpose of deceiving and preempting the Government, particularly the
PCGG, and making it appear that defendant Benjamin Romualdez had
already divested himself of his ownership of the same when in truth
and in fact, his interests are well intact and being protected by
Atty. Jose F S. Bengzon, Jr. and some of hie law partners, together
with the FMMC senior managers who still control and run the affairs
of said corporations, and in order to entice the PCGG to approve the
said fictitious sale, the above-named defendants offered P20 million
as 'donation' to the Government;
(p) misused, with the connivance,
support and technical assistance of the Bengzon law finn represented
by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. as legal counsel, together with
defendants Cesar Zalamea, Antonio Ozaeta, Mario D. Camacho and Senen
J. Gabaldon as members of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Commercial International Bank (PCIB), the Meralco Pension Fund (Fund,
for short) in the amount of P25 million by causing it to be invested
in the PCIB and through the Bank's TSG, assigned to PCI Development
and PCI Equity at 50% each, the Fund's (a) 8,028,011 common shares in
the Bank and (b) 'Deposit in Subscription' in the amount of
P4,929,972.50 but of the agreed consideration of P28 million for the
said assignment, PCI Development and PCI Equity were able to pay only
P5,500.00 downpayment and the first amortization of P3,937,500.00
thus prompting the Fund to rescind its assignment, and the consequent
reversion of the assigned shares brought the total shareholding of
the Fund to 11,470,555 voting shares or 36.8% of the voting stock of
the PCIB, and this development (which the defendants themselves
orchestrated or allowed to happen) was used by them as an excuse for
the unlawful dismantling or cancellation of the Fund's 10 million
shares for allegedly exceeding the 30-percent ceiling prescribed by
Section 12-B of the General Banking Act, although they know for a
fact that what the law declares as unlawful and void ab initio are
the subscriptions in excess of the 30% ceiling 'to the extent of the
excess over any of the ceilings prescribed . . . ' and not the whole
or entire stockholding which they allowed to stay for six years (from
June 30, 1980 to March 24, 1986);
(q) cleverly hid behind the veil of
corporate entity, through the use of the names and managerial
expertise of the FMMC senior managers and lawyers identified as Jose
B. Sandejas, Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Abelardo S. Termulo,
Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Rex C. Drilon II, Kurt
Bachmann, Jr. together with the legal talents of corporate lawyers,
such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Jose V.E. Jimenez, Amando V.
Faustino, Jr. and Leonardo C. Cruz, the ill-gotten wealth of Benjamin
T. Romualdez including, among others, the 6,229,177 shares in PCIB
registered in the names of Trans Middle East Phils. Equities, Inc.
and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr. which they refused to surrender to PCGG
despite their disclosure as they tried and continue to exert efforts
in getting hold of the same as well as the shares in Benguet
registered in the names of Palm Avenue Holdings and Palm Avenue
Realty Development Corp. purportedly to be applied as payment for the
claim of P70 million of a 'merger company of the First Manila
Management Corp. group' supposedly owned by them although the truth
is that all the said firms are still beneficially owned by defendants
Benjamin Romualdez.
xxx xxx
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On 28 September 1988, petitioners (as
defendants) filed their respective answers. 2 Meanwhile, from 2 to 6
August 1988, conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of
the "Romualdez corporations" were carried in various
metropolitan newspapers. Thus, one newspaper reported that the
Romualdez firms had not been sequestered because of the opposition of
certain PCGG officials who "had worked previously as lawyers of
the Marcos crony firms." Another daily reported otherwise, while
others declared that on 3 March 1986, or shortly after the EDSA
February 1986 revolution, the "Romualdez companies" were
sold for P5 million, without PCGG approval, to a holding company
controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the President's
brother-in-law, had effectively taken over the firms, even pending
negotiations for the purchase of the corporations, for the same price
of P5 million which was reportedly way below the fair value of their
assets. 3
On 13 September 1988, the Senate
Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech "on
a matter of personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged
"take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flagship of the First
Manila Management of Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and
called upon "the Senate to look into the possible violation of
the law in the case, particularly with regard to Republic Act No.
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." 4
On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado,
the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). 5
Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its
investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were
subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what
they know" regarding the "sale of the thirty-six (36)
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
At the hearing held on 23 May 1989,
Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the Found that his testimony may
"unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035
before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. likewise
refused to testify invoking his constitutional right to due process,
and averring that the publicity generated by respondent Committee's
inquiry could adversely affect his rights as well as those of the
other petitioners who are his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 0035
before the Sandiganbayan.
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,
thereupon, suspended its inquiry and directed the petitioners to file
their memorandum on the constitutional issues raised, after which, it
issued a resolution 6 dated 5 June 1989 rejecting the petitioners'
plea to be excused from testifying, and the Committee voted to pursue
and continue its investigation of the matter. Senator Neptali
Gonzales dissented. 7
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance and
testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its
jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard
of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable
damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with
a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief.
Meanwhile, one of the defendants in
Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan, Jose S. Sandejas, filed
with the Court a motion for intervention, 8 which the Court granted
in the resolution 9 of 21 December 1989, and required the respondent
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in
intervention. In compliance therewith, respondent Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee filed its comment 10 thereon.
Before discussing the issues raised by
petitioners and intervenor, we will first tackle the jurisdictional
question raised by the respondent Committee.
In its comment, respondent Committee
claims that this Court cannot properly inquire into the motives of
the lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations, much less can
it enjoin the Congress or any of its regular and special committees —
like what petitioners seek — from making inquiries in aid of
legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers, which
obtains in our present system of government.
The contention is untenable. In Angara
vs. Electoral Commission, 11 the Court held:
"The separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it
does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept
separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government.
xxx xxx
xxx
"But in the main, the Constitution
has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of
power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments
of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and
duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it
hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In
times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if
not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
xxx xxx
xxx
The Constitution is a definition of the
powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the
judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries; it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees
to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
'judicial supremacy' which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed
to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government."
The "allocation of constitutional
boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the
Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, 12 "(t)he
political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to
judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to
delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It
cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
although said provision by no means does away with the applicability
of the principle in appropriate cases." 13
The Court is thus of the considered
view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private
affairs in purported aid of legislation.
Coming to the specific issues raised in
this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not
done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of the
Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction"
which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to
inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due
process.
The 1987 Constitution expressly
recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation. 14 Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof
provides:
"The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance wish its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected." 15
The power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute
or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted
provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the
investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the
Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process
and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.
The power to conduct formal inquiries
or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation.
Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of
any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the
formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and
all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the
Senate alone.
As held in Jean L. Aznault vs. Leon
Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of
the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the
exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to
legislate or to expel a member.
Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned
Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech
or resolution filed by any Senator which in its judgment requires an
appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order therefore to
ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had
to the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed
to be made.
A perusal of the speech of Senator
Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a statement which was
published in various newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr.
Ricardo "Baby" Lopa of "having taken over the FMMC
Group of Companies." As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a
letter to Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988 categorically denying
that he had "taken over" the FMMC Group of Companies; that
former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself categorically stated in a
telecast interview by Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August 1988
that there has been no takeover by him (Lopa); and that these
repeated allegations of a "takeover" on his (Lopa's) part
of FMMC are baseless as they are malicious.
The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile,
during the session of the Senate on 13 September 1988, to avail of
the privilege hour, 17 so that he could respond to the said Lopa
letter, and also to vindicate his reputation as a Member of the
Senate of the Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa that his
(Enrile's) charges that he (Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of
Companies are "baseless" and "malicious." Thus,
in his speech, 18 Senator Enrile said, among others, as follows:
"Mr. President, I rise this
afternoon on a matter of personal privilege; the privilege being that
I received, Mr. President, a letter dated September 4, 1988, signed
by Mr. Ricardo A. Lopa, a.k.a. or Baby Lopa, wherein he denies
categorically that he has taken over the First Manila Management
Group of Companies which includes SOLOIL Incorporated.
xxx xxx
xxx
"In answer to Mr. Lopa, I will
quote pertinent portions from an Official Memorandum to the
Presidential Commission on Good Government written and signed by
former Governor, now Congressman Jose Ramirez, in his capacity as
head of the PCGG Task Force for Region VIII. In his memorandum dated
July 3, 1986, then Governor Ramirez stated that when he and the
members of his task force sought to serve a sequestration order on
the management of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte, management officials
assured him that relatives of the President of the Philippines were
personally discussing and representing SOLOIL so that the order of
sequestration would be lifted and that the new owner was Mr. Ricardo
A. Lopa.
"I will quote the pertinent
portions in the Ramirez' memorandum.
"The first paragraph of the
memorandum reads as follows and I quote, Mr. President:
'Our sequestration work of SOLOIL in
Tanauan, Leyte was not heeded by management because they said another
representation was being made to this Commission for the eventual
lifting of our sequestration order. They even assured us that Mr.
Ricardo Lopa and Peping Cojuangco were personally discussing and
representing SOLOIL, so the order of sequestration will finally be
lifted. While we attempted to carry on our order, management refused
to cooperate and vehemently turned down our request to make available
to us the records of the company. In fact it was obviously clear that
they will meet us with force the moment we insist on doing normally
our assigned task. In view of the impending threat, and to avoid any
untoward incident we decided to temporarily suspend our work until
there is a more categorical stand of this Commission in view of the
seemingly influential representation being made by SOLOIL for us not
to continue our work.'
"Another pertinent portion of the
same memorandum is paragraph five, which reads as follows, and I
quote Mr. President:
'The President, Mr. Gamboa, this is, I
understand, the President of SOLOIL, and the Plant Superintendent,
Mr. Jimenez including their chief counsel, Atty. Mandong Mendiola are
now saying that there have been divestment, and that the new owner is
now Mr. Ricardo Lopa who according to them, is the brother-in-law of
the President. They even went further by telling us that ever Peping
Cojuangco who we know is the brother of her excellency is also
interested in the ownership and management of SOLOIL. When he
demanded for supporting papers which will indicate aforesaid
divestment, Messrs. Gamboa, Jimenez and Mendiola refused vehemently
to submit these papers to us, instead they said it will be submitted
directly to this Commission. To our mind their continuous dropping of
names is not good for this Commission and even to the President if
our desire is to achieve respectability and stability of the
government.'
"The contents of the memorandum of
then Governor and now Congressman Jose Ramirez were personally
confirmed by him in a news interview last September 7, 1988.
xxx xxx
xxx
"Also relevant to this case, Mr.
President, is a letter of Mr. Ricardo Lopa himself in August 11, 1988
issue of the newspaper Malaya headlined 'On Alleged Takeover of
Romualdez Firms.'
"Mr. Lopa states in the last
paragraph of the published letter and I quote him:
'12. As of this writing, the sales
agreement is under review by the PCGG solely to determine the
appropriate price. The sale of these companies and our prior right to
reacquire them have never been at issue.'
"Perhaps I could not make it any
clearer to Mr. Lopa that I was not really making baseless and
malicious statements."
Senator Enrile concluded his privilege
speech in the following tenor:
"Mr. President, it may be
worthwhile for the Senate to look into the possible violation of the
law in the case particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019,
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5 of which reads as
follows and I quote:
'SECTION 5. Prohibition on certain
relatives. — It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for any
relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil
degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of
the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, to intervene directly or indirectly, in any
business, transaction, contract or application with the Government:
Provided, that this section shall not apply to any person who prior
to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he
is related, has been already dealing with the Government along the
same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or
application filed by him for approval of which is not discretionary
on the part of the officials concerned but depends upon compliance
with requisites provided by law, nor to any act lawfully performed in
an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.'
"Mr. President, I have done duty
to this Senate and to myself. I leave it to this august Body to make
its own conclusion."
Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile
contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called
upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No.
3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act." In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted
by respondent Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not
the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. Ricardo Lopa, had
violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the
Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation
involved.
The Court is also not impressed with
the respondent Committee's argument that the questioned inquiry is to
be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212. The said
resolution was introduced by Senator Jose D. Lina in view of the
representations made by leaders of school youth, community groups and
youth of non-governmental organizations to the Senate Committee on
Youth and Sports Development, to look into the charges against the
PCGG filed by three (3) stockholders of Oriental Petroleum, i.e.,
that it had adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its
nominee-directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm. The
pertinent portion of Senate Resolution No. 212 reads as follows:
xxx xxx
xxx
"WHEREAS, recent developments have
shown that no less than the Solicitor-General has stated that the
PCGG Chairman and at least three Commissioners should resign and that
the agency should rid itself of 'ineptness, incompetence and
corruption' and that the Sandiganbayan has reportedly ordered the
PCGG to answer charges filed by three stockholders of Oriental
Petroleum that it had adopted a 'get-rich-quick scheme' for its
nominee-directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm;
"WHEREAS, leaders of school youth,
community groups and youth of non-governmental organization had made
representations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports
Development to look into the charges against PCGG since said agency
is a symbol of the changes expected by the people when the EDSA
revolution took place and that the ill-gotten wealth to be recovered
will fund priority projects which will benefit our people such as
CARP, free education in the elementary and secondary levels,
reforestration, and employment generation for rural and urban
workers;
"WHEREAS, the government and the
present leadership must demonstrate in their public and private lives
integrity, honor and efficient management of government services lest
our youth become disillusioned and lose hope and return to an
ideology and form of government which is repugnant to true freedom,
democratic participation and human rights: Now, therefore, be it.
"Resolved by the Senate, That the
activities of the Presidential Commission on Good Government be
investigated by the appropriate Committee in connection with the
implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution."
19
Thus, the inquiry under Senate
Resolution No. 212 is to look into the charges against the PCGG filed
by the three (3) stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection
with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the
Constitution.
It cannot, therefore, be said that the
contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39)
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the
Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212,
because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and,
secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are
connected with the government but are private citizens.
It appears, therefore, that the
contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in
aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose
within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the
President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019,
the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that
appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the
legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr.
Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case. In John T .
Watkins vs. United States, 20 it was held:
" . . . . The power of congress to
conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That
power is broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly
needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social,
economic, or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress to
remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal
Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. But broad as
is this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general
authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without
justification in terms of the functions of congress. This was freely
conceded by the Solicitor General in his argument in this case. Nor
is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. These are
functions of the executive and judicial departments of government. No
inquiry is an end in itself ; it must be related to and in
furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress. Investigations
conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators
or to 'punish' those investigated are indefensible." (emphasis
supplied)
It can not be overlooked that when
respondent Committee decided to conduct its investigation of the
petitioners, the complaint in Civil Case No. 0035 had already been
filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint shows that
one of its principal causes of action against herein petitioners, as
defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39)
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Since
the issues in said complaint had long been joined by the filing of
petitioners' respective answers thereto, the issue sought to be
investigated by the respondent Committee is one over which
jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the
issue has been pre-empted by that court. To allow the respondent
Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before
the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of conflicting
judgments between a legislative committee and a judicial tribunal,
but if the Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the
Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made to bear on
the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted.
In fine, for the respondent Committee
to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy already
before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the exclusive
domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in. In
Baremblatt vs. United States, 21 it was held that:
"Broad as it is, the power is not,
however, without limitations. Since Congress may only investigate
into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or
appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the
exclusive province of one of the other branches of the government.
Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire
into matters that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary.
Neither can it supplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to
the Executive. . . . ."
Now to another matter. It has been held
that "a congressional committee's right to inquire is 'subject
to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on
governmental action,' including 'the relevant limitations of the Bill
of Rights'." 22
In another case —
" . . . the mere semblance of
legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the
Bill of Rights. The critical element is the existence of, and the
weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding
disclosures from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume,
however, that every congressional investigation is justified by a
public need that over-balances any private rights affected. To do so
would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution
upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably
encroach upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his
liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly." 23
One of the basic rights guaranteed by
the Constitution to an individual is the right against
self-incrimination. 24 This right construed as the right to remain
completely silent may be availed of by the accused in a criminal
case; but it may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are
asked of them.
This distinction was enunciated by the
Court in Romeo Chavez vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al. 25
thus —
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a
different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an
ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim
the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is
shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness
stand and refuse to answer any and all questions."
Moreover, this right of the accused is
extended to respondents administrative investigations but only if
they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a
criminal proceeding. In Galman vs. Pamaran, 26 the Court reiterated
the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the
right of witnesses to invoke the right against self-incrimination not
only in criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit.
It was held that:
"We did not therein state that
since he is not an accused and the case is not a criminal case, Cabal
cannot refuse to take the witness stand and testify, and that he can
invoke his right against self-incrimination only when a question
which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is
propounded to him. Clearly then, it is not the character of the suit
involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The
privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings
sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to
be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not."
We do not here modify these doctrines.
If we presently rule that petitioners may not be compelled by the
respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before
it, it is only because we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in
aid of legislation and, If pursued, would be violative of the
principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the
judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Court holds that, under the facts, including the circumstance that
petitioners are presently impleaded as defendants in a case before
the Sandiganbayan, which involves issues intimately related to the
subject of contemplated inquiry before the respondent Committee, the
respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is hereby enjoined from
compelling the petitioners and intervenor to testify before it and
produce evidence at the said inquiry.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C .J ., Melencio-Herrera,
Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and
Romero, JJ ., concur.