FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 75025. September 14, 1993.]
VICENTE GARCIA, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND
TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TELECOM
REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV, respondents.
Eulogio B. Alzaga for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J p:
Petitioner comes to us on a petition
for review on certiorari of the decision of 23 July 1985 of
respondent Commission on Audit (COA) denying his claim for payment of
back wages, after he was reinstated to the service pursuant to an
executive clemency. He prays for the extraordinary remedy of mandamus
against public respondents to enforce his claim.
Petitioner was a Supervising Lineman in
the Region IV Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena
City. On 1 April 1975, petitioner was summarily dismissed from the
service on the ground of dishonesty in accordance with the decision
of the then Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications in Adm. Case No. 975 for the loss of several telegraph
poles which were located at the Sariaya-Lucena City and
Mauban-Sampaloc, Quezon, telecom lines. Petitioner did not appeal
from the decision.
Based on the same facts obtaining in
the administrative action, a criminal case for qualified theft was
filed against petitioner with the then Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Quezon. On 23 January 1980, the trial court
rendered its decision acquitting petitioner of the offense charged.
Consequently, petitioner sought
reinstatement to his former position in view of his acquittal in the
criminal case. In an indorsement dated 7 April 1980, petitioner's
request to be reinstated was denied by the Bureau of
Telecommunications. Hence, petitioner pleaded to the President of the
Philippines for executive clemency.
On 26 August 1981, acting on the
favorable indorsements of the then Ministry of Transportation and
Communications and the Civil Service Commission, Deputy Presidential
Executive Assistant Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., by authority of the
President, per Resolution No. O.P. 1800, granted executive clemency
to petitioner.
Petitioner thereafter filed with
respondent COA a claim for payment of back salaries effective 1 April
1975, the date of his dismissal from the service. This was denied by
the COA in its 5th Indorsement dated 12 October 1982 on the ground
that the executive clemency granted to him did not provide for the
payment of back salaries and that he has not been reinstated in the
service.
It appears that petitioner was recalled
to the service on 12 March 1984 but the records do not show whether
petitioner's reinstatement was to the same position of Supervising
Lineman. 1
Petitioner again filed a claim to
recover his back salaries for the period from 1 April 1975, the date
of his dismissal, to 12 March 1984, when he was reinstated. In
Decision No. 362 embodied in its 3rd Indorsement dated 23 July 1985,
respondent COA denied the claim stating that the executive clemency
was silent on the payment of back wages and that he had not rendered
service during the period of his claim.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the COA
decision of 23 July 1985 to the Office of the President. On 21 April
1986, Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., by
authority of the President, denied the appeal "due to legal and
constitutional constraint," 2 holding that this Court is the
proper forum to take cognizance of the appeal on certiorari from the
decision of the COA, citing Art. XII-(D), Sec. 2, par. 2, of the 1973
Constitution (now Art. IX-[A], Sec. 7, of the 1987 Constitution).
Hence, petitioner filed the instant
petition on the issue of whether he is entitled to the payment of
back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of
executive clemency.
In his comment to the petition, the
Solicitor General recommends that the petition be given due course
and the petitioner be awarded back wages to be determined in the
light of existing laws and jurisprudence. The Solicitor General
submits that the award is implicit in the grant of executive
clemency, the ultimate objective of which is to accord full justice
to petitioner.
On the other hand, the COA asks this
Court to deny the petition for the following reasons: (a)
petitioner's acquittal in the criminal case did not necessarily free
him from administrative liability; (b) petitioner's unexplained
failure to appeal the decision in the administrative case was
tantamount to a waiver or renunciation of his right to back wages;
(c) the executive clemency was granted to petitioner for the purpose
of reinstatement only since it was silent on the matter of back
wages; (d) the award of back wages is allowed only if the respondent
is exonerated from the administrative charge or that his suspension
or dismissal is declared illegal or unjustified by the court; and,
(e) petitioner did not render any service during the period before
his reinstatement, hence, he is not entitled to back wages based on
the "no service, no pay" rule.
The petition is meritorious.
Every civilized country recognizes, and
has therefore provided for, the pardoning power to be exercised as an
act of grace and humanity, in proper cases. Without such a power of
clemency, to be exercised by some department or functionary of a
government, a country would be most imperfect and deficient in its
political morality and in that attribute of Deity whose judgments are
always tempered with mercy. 3
Our Constitution reposes in the
President the power and the exclusive prerogative to extend executive
clemency under the following circumstances:
"Except in cases of impeachment or
as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
"He shall also have the power to
grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members
of the Congress." 4
From among the different acts of
executive clemency spelled out above, the clemency granted to
petitioner in the instant case partakes of the nature of an executive
pardon. A reading of Resolution No. O.P. 1800 partly quoted hereunder
is enlightening:
"In a 3rd Indorsement dated
September 5, 1980, the Director of Telecommunications interposed no
objection to the petition, while the Minister of Transportation and
Communications, in his 4th Indorsement dated November 17, 1980,
favorably recommended the grant of executive clemency to petitioner
for the reason that 'while it is a rule that an administrative case
is separate and distinct from a criminal case and an acquittal in the
latter case does not ipso facto result in the exoneration in the
former case, yet an exception could arise if the basis for the
acquittal was the innocence of the accused as in the case of
petitioner Garcia.'
"Asked for comment pursuant to
Section 43 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service
Commission recommends the grant of executive clemency to petitioner
in view of the findings of the court that —
'instead of coming forward to the
defense of the accused who actually was authorized to uproot or
recover the poles in question and of commending the latter for his
high sense of responsibility in preventing losses to the government,
said high officials had even the temerity to disown and deny the
authority they gave to the accused resulting in his separation from
the service and having him all alone in defending himself against the
accusation of the very government he tried to protect.'
"After a careful study, this
Office is inclined to grant executive clemency to petitioner in the
light of the decision of the court acquitting him of the crime of
qualified theft which was based on the same acts obtaining in
Administrative Case No. 975 against him, coupled with the favorable
recommendation of the Minister of Transportation and Communications
and the Civil Service Commission.
"In view of the foregoing,
petitioner Vicente Garcia is hereby granted executive clemency."
5
Time and again this Court has unfolded
the effects of a pardon upon the individual to whom it is granted. In
Monsanto v. Factoran 6 , we have firmly established the general
rule that while a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out
the existence of guilt so that in the eyes of the law the offender is
as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not
operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness
or remission of guilt and not forgetfulness. It does not erase the
fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof.
Pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores to him all his civil rights. Unless
expressly grounded on the person's innocence, it cannot bring back
lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. The pardoned
offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office
which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense. But
since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement
because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not
entitled to back wages.
But, stated otherwise, if the pardon is
based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence
and makes him a new man and as innocent as if he had not been found
guilty of the offense charged. 7 When a person is given pardon
because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the
party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby
restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained
character prior to the finding of guilt.
In the case at bar, petitioner was
found administratively liable for dishonesty and consequently
dismissed from the service. However, he was later acquitted by the
trial court of the charge of qualified theft based on the very same
acts for which he was dismissed. The acquittal of petitioner by the
trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt
but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to
him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court
commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public
servant. Verily, petitioner's innocence is the primary reason behind
the grant of executive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable
recommendations for his reinstatement by the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service Commission.
The bestowal of executive clemency on
petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of
the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and
ordered his separation from the service. This can be inferred from
the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the
administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, which
is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This signifies that
petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former
employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance
of the clemency.
Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to
the government service entitles him to back wages. 8 This is meant
to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to
make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust
dismissal from the service. To rule otherwise would defeat the very
intention of the executive clemency, i.e., to give justice to
petitioner. Moreover, the right to back wages is afforded to those
who have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or
to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against them. 9 There
is no doubt that petitioner's case falls within the situations
aforementioned to entitle him to back wages.
Further, it is worthy to note that the
dismissal of petitioner was not the result of any criminal conviction
that carried with it forfeiture of the right to hold public office,
but is the direct consequence of an administrative decision of a
branch of the Executive Department over which the President, as its
head, has the power of control. The President's control has been
defined to mean "the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for the latter." 10 In pardoning petitioner and
ordering his reinstatement, the Chief Executive exercised his power
of control and set aside the decision of the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications. The clemency nullified the
dismissal of petitioner and relieved him from administrative
liability. The separation of the petitioner from the service being
null and void, he is thus entitled to back wages.
After having been declared innocent of
the crime of qualified theft, which also served as basis for the
administrative charge, petitioner should not be considered to have
left his office for all legal purposes, so that he is entitled to all
the rights and privileges that accrued to him by virtue of the office
held, including back wages. 11
Established jurisprudence fixes
recovery of back wages to a period of five (5) years to be paid an
illegally dismissed government employee who has been ordered
reinstated. 12 The cases heretofore decided by this Court show
that petitioners therein were employees of local governments who were
removed from office by their local officials. The reasons given for
their removal were abolition of office or position, reduction of work
force, or lack of funds on the part of the local governments
concerned, which reasons were found by this Court to be either devoid
of factual basis or not sufficiently proven, otherwise, their
dismissal would have been valid and justified. In contrast, the case
before us is different, involving as it does circumstances that impel
us to deviate from the general rule previously laid down on the
recovery of back wages for five (5) years. Petitioner's reinstatement
in the instant case which was ordered pursuant to a grant of
executive clemency was effected not because of lack of sufficient
proof of his commission of the offense but that, more importantly, he
did not commit the offense charged. Verily law, equity and justice
dictate that petitioner be afforded compassion for the embarrassment,
humiliation and, above all, injustice caused to him and his family by
his unfounded dismissal. This Court cannot help surmising the painful
stigma that must have caused petitioner, the incursion on his dignity
and reputation, for having been adjudged, albeit wrongfully, a
dishonest man, and worse, a thief. Consequently, this Court finds it
fair and just to award petitioner full back wages from 1 April 1975
when he was illegally dismissed, to 12 March 1984 when he was
reinstated. The payment shall be without deduction or qualification.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of respondent Commission on Audit dated 23 July 1985 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered ordering public
respondents, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, the Minister
(now Secretary) of Land Transportation and Communications, the
Regional Director of Telecom Regional Office No. IV, or whoever may
be sitting in office in their stead, to pay the full amount of
petitioner's back salaries from 1 April 1975 to 12 March 1984 based
on his latest salary scale.
SO ORDERED.