EN BANC
[G.R. No. 78239. February 9, 1989.]
SALVACION A. MONSANTO, petitioner, vs.
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondent.
D E C I S I O N
FERNAN, C.J p:
The principal question raised in this
petition for review is whether or not a public officer, who has been
granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment.
In a decision rendered on March 25,
1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto
(then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused,
of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents
and sentenced them to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of
P3,500. They were further ordered to jointly and severally indemnify
the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of
the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her
conviction to this Court which subsequently affirmed the same. She
then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was
pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984 by then President
Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984.
By reason of said pardon, petitioner
wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to
her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still
vacant.
Petitioner's letter-request was
referred to the Ministry of Finance for resolution in view of the
provision of the Local Government Code transferring the power of
appointment of treasurers from the city governments to the said
Ministry. In its 4th Indorsement dated March 1, 1985, the Finance
Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position
without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date
she was extended the absolute pardon. It also directed the city
treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which the
Sandiganbayan had required to be indemnified in favor of the
government as well as the costs of the litigation, be satisfied. 1
Seeking reconsideration of the
foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry on April 17, 1985
stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the
crime which implies that her service in the government has never been
interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should
correspond to the date of her preventive suspension which is August
1, 1982; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her
suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50. 2
The Ministry of Finance, however,
referred petitioner's letter to the Office of the President for
further review and action. On April 15, 1986, said Office, through
Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. held:
"We disagree with both the
Ministry of Finance and the petitioner because, as borne out by the
records, petitioner was convicted of the crime for which she was
accused. In line with the government's crusade to restore absolute
honesty in public service, this Office adopts, as a juridical guide
(Miranda v. Imperial, 77 Phil. 1966), the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan, 2nd Division, in People v. Lising, Crim. Case No.
6675, October 4, 1985, that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a
former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his
former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits
and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension
pendente lite.
"In fact, in such a situation, the
former public official must secure a reappointment before he can
reassume his former position.
"Anent the civil liability of
Monsanto, the Revised Penal Code expressly provides that `a pardon
shall in no case exempt the culprit from payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.' (Sec. 36, par. 2).
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this
Office holds that Salvacion A. Monsanto is not entitled to an
automatic reinstatement on the basis of the absolute pardon granted
her but must secure an appointment to her former position and that,
notwithstanding said absolute pardon, she is liable for the civil
liability concomitant to her previous conviction." 3
Her subsequent motion for
reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present
petition in her behalf. We gave due course on October 13, 1987.
Petitioner's basic theory is that the
general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the
fact that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction
was still pending appeal in this Court. There having been no final
judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as assistant city
treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or forfeited. In
other words, without that final judgment of conviction, the accessory
penalty of forfeiture of office did not attach and the status of her
employment remained "suspended." More importantly, when
pardon was issued before the final verdict of guilt, it was an
acquittal because there was no offense to speak of. In effect, the
President has declared her not guilty of the crime charged and has
accordingly dismissed the same. 4
It is well to remember that petitioner
had been convicted of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification
of public documents and sentenced to imprisonment of four years, two
months and one day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten years
and one day of prision mayor as maximum. The penalty of prision mayor
carries the accessory penalties of temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage, enforceable during the term of the principal
penalty. 5 Temporary absolute disqualification bars the convict from
public office or employment, such disqualification to last during the
term of the sentence. 6 Even if the offender be pardoned, as to the
principal penalty, the accessory penalties remain unless the same
have been expressly remitted by the pardon. 7 The penalty of prision
correccional carries, as one of its accessory penalties, suspension
from public office. 8
The propositions earlier advanced by
petitioner reveal her inadequate understanding of the nature of
pardon and its legal consequences. This is not totally unexpected
considering that the authorities on the subject have not been wholly
consistent particularly in describing the effects of pardon.
The benign mercy of pardon is of
British origin, conceived to temper the gravity of the Kings wrath.
But Philippine jurisprudence on the subject has been largely
influenced by American case law.
Pardon is defined as "an act of
grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the
laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the
private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered
to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not
communicated officially to the Court. . . . A pardon is a deed, to
the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not
complete without acceptance. 8a
At the time the antecedents of the
present case took place, the pardoning power was governed by the 1973
Constitution as amended in the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The
pertinent provision reads:
"The President may, except in
cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardon, remit
fines and forfeitures, and with the concurrence of the Batasang
Pambansa, grant amnesty." 9
The 1981 amendments had deleted the
earlier rule that clemency could be extended only upon final
conviction, implying that clemency could be given even before
conviction. Thus, petitioner's unconditional pardon was granted even
as her appeal was pending in the High Court. It is worth mentioning
that under the 1987 Constitution, the former limitation of final
conviction was restored. But be that as it may, it is our view that
in the present case, it is not material when the pardon was bestowed,
whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the
same. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have
abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction by the
Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality.
Having disposed of that preliminary
point, we proceed to discuss the effects of a full and absolute
pardon in relation to the decisive question of whether or not the
plenary pardon had the effect of removing the disqualifications
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
In Pelobello v. Palatino, 10 we find a
reiteration of the stand consistently adopted by the courts on the
various consequences of pardon: ". . . we adopt the broad view
expressed in Cristobal v. Labrador, G.R. No. 47941, December 7, 1940,
that subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the
pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative
action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime
committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction.
. . . (W)e are of the opinion that the better view in the light of
the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily
restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after an
inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone
the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving completely the
party . . . concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities
of criminal conviction."
The Pelobello v. Palatino and Cristobal
v. Labrador cases, 11 and several others 12 show the unmistakable
application of the doctrinal case of Ex Parte Garland, 13 whose
sweeping generalizations to this day continue to hold sway in our
jurisprudence despite the fact that much of its relevance has been
downplayed by later American decisions.
Consider the following broad
statements:
"A pardon reaches both the
punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender;
and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out
of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender If
as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted
before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities,
consequent upon conviction, from attaching, if granted after
conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores
him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and
gives him a new credit and capacity." 14
Such generalities have not been
universally accepted, recognized or approved. 15 The modern trend of
authorities now rejects the unduly broad language of the Garland case
(reputed to be perhaps the most extreme statement which has been made
on the effects of a pardon). To our mind, this is the more realistic
approach. While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out
the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is
as innocent as though he never Committed the offense, it does not
operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness
or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the
fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It
does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not
forgetfulness. 16
The better considered cases regard full
pardon (at least one not based on the offender's innocence) as
relieving the party from all the punitive consequences of his
criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based
on the finding of guilt. 17 But it relieves him from nothing more.
"To say, however, that the offender is a `new man', and `as
innocent as if he had never committed the offense;' is to ignore the
difference between the crime and the criminal. A person adjudged
guilty of an offense is a convicted criminal, though pardoned; he may
be deserving of punishment, though left unpunished; and the law may
regard him as more dangerous to society than one never found guilty
of crime, though it places no restraints upon him following his
conviction." 18
A pardon looks to the future. It is not
retrospective. 19 It makes no amends for the past. It affords no
relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose
upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has
been suffered. "Since the offense has been established by
judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they
were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly
suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required." 20 This
would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to
receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
Petitioner maintains that when she was
issued absolute pardon, the Chief Executive declared her not guilty
of the crime for which she was convicted. In the case of State v.
Hazzard, 21 we find this strong observation: "To assume that all
or even a major number of pardons are issued because of innocence of
the recipients is not only to indict our judicial system, but
requires us to assume that which we all know to be untrue. The very
act of forgiveness implies the commission of wrong, and that wrong
has been established by the most complete method known to modern
civilization. Pardons may relieve from the disability of fines and
forfeitures attendant upon a conviction, but they cannot erase the
stain of bad character, which has been definitely fixed." 22
In this ponencia, the Court wishes to
stress one vital point: While we are prepared to concede that pardon
may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only
to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential
prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do
not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the
guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be
treated as if he were innocent For whatever may have been the
judicial dicta in the past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce
such "moral changes" as to equate a pardoned convict in
character and conduct with one who has constantly maintained the mark
of a good, law-abiding citizen.
Pardon cannot mask the acts
constituting the crime. These are "historical" facts which,
despite the public manifestation of mercy and forgiveness implicit in
pardon, "ordinary, prudent men will take into account in their
subsequent dealings with the actor." 23
Pardon granted after conviction frees
the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and
restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded
on the person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost
reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. 24 This must be
constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character and
purpose of the privilege.
Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and
effusive language of the Garland case, we are in full agreement with
the commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore a
convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or
forfeited by reason of the conviction 25 although such pardon
undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
26
The rationale is plainly evident.
Public offices are intended primarily for the collective protection,
safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to
favor private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because
of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the
offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full
and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing
appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral
risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
For petitioner Monsanto, this is the
bottom line: the absolute disqualification or ineligibility from
public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is
clear from the authorities referred to that when her guilt and
punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability
was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply for
reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her
conviction. And in considering her qualifications and suitability for
the public post, the facts constituting her offense must be and
should be evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately
whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated
differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in
removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it
cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city
treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure required
for a new appointment.
Finally, petitioner has sought
exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by
the sentence. The Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability arising
from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence
is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence.
Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same
causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the
thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor
and debtor, compensation and novation. 27
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of
former Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated
April 15, 1986, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
So ordered.