EN BANC
[G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993.]
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge,
Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, Antique, petitioner, vs. HON.
OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ABIERA,
respondents.
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda for and in his
own behalf.
Public Attorney's Office for private
respondent.
D E C I S I O N
NOCON, J p:
The issue in this petition for
certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
restraining order is whether the Office of the Ombudsman could
entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a
judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming
that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme
Court.
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda,
Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique,
seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the
ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner;
and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint dated April
18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent
Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that
petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated
February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal
cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a
period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before
January 31, 1998," when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew
that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10)
criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent
Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his
certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June,
July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to
September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends
that he had been granted by this Court an extension of ninety (90)
days to decide the aforementioned cases.
Petitioner also contends that the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's
ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 since the offense charged arose
from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under
the control and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the
investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the
Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior
courts.
The Court disagrees with the first Part
of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in
Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge
unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his
certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme
Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under
the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
However, We agree with petitioner that
in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this
Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation
being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987
Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial
court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court
that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with
all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if
they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its
investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the
Constitution, 3 for such a justification not only runs counter to
the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers
to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but
likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer
the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for
determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status
of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to
make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as
one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to
allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public
respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. 4
The rationale for the foregoing
pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively. the question
before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court
an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases
in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been
raised with, much less resolved by, this Court. how could the
Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the
resolution of said question?
In fine, where a criminal complaint
against a Judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said
complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether
said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the
complaint filed by public respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to
refer the same to this Court for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.