SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116049. March 20, 1995.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs. HON. EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 47,
Puerto Princess City, ARNE STROM and GRACE REYES, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Bermejo, Gualberto and Naciangayo Law
Office for private respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BIDIN, J p:
This special civil action for
certiorari seeks to annul the order dated March 18, 1994 of
respondent judge, the Hon. Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. of the Regional
Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, granting the Motion
to Quash filed by the accused, now herein respondents Arne Strom and
Grace A. Reyes in Criminal Case No. 11529 of said court.
On February 2, 1994, a complaint
(Criminal Case No. 11529) for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A.
No. 108) was filed by Asst. City Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against
respondents Strom and Reyes. The accused filed a Motion to
Quash/Dismiss the criminal case contending that since the power to
prosecute is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under
Republic Act No. 1130, the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no
power or authority to file the same. The prosecution filed an
opposition pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has already been
abolished by Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972. Despite
such opposition, however, respondent judge granted the motion
espousing the position that the Letter of Implementation relied upon
by the City Fiscal is not the "law" contemplated in Article
7 of the New civil code which can repeal another law such as R.A.
1130. Thus, respondent judge in the assailed order of March 18, 1994
held as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of all
the foregoing facts and consideration, as the City Prosecutor has no
power or authority to file and prosecute this case for reasons amply
discussed above, the Court hereby orders this case quashed in the
interest of justice, without costs" (Rollo, p. 27).
The prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration but respondent judge denied the same in an order
dated April 12, 1994, the pertinent portions of which are quoted
hereunder:
" . . . It may be ignorance of the
law to insist that the law, Republic Act 1130 was repealed or amended
by Letter of Instruction (sic) No. 2, Series of 1972 as what the City
Prosecutor has harped all along. A Letter of Instruction (sic) is not
a law by any standard and neither has it the force and effect of law.
A contrary contention would be violative of Article 7 of the New
Civil Code which provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones, and of the Rules of Statutory Construction.
"Besides, penal statues are
strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused. The rules in all criminal prosecutions is that all doubts
are resolved in favor of the accused. In the case at bar, the Court
seriously doubts that the City Prosecutor has the power or the
authority to investigate violations of the Anti-Dummy Law and to file
and prosecute cases of this kind before our courts, as that is lodged
with the Anti-Dummy Board under R.A. 1130.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the Motion for Reconsideration mentioned above is hereby denied for
sheer lack of merit, and the Order dated March 18, 1994 quashing this
case is maintained" (Rollo, p. 5).
Hence, the present petition.
After the filing of the comments by
respondents, this Court gave due course to the petition, in a
resolution dated October 24, 1994.
The only issue to be resolved in this
case is whether or not respondent judge in granting the Motion to
Quash, gravely abused his discretion as to warrant the issuance of a
writ of certiorari as prayed for by petitioners herein.
In resolving this issue, it must be
recalled that immediately after the proclamation of martial law, the
late President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1 to
reorganize the entire Executive Branch of the National Government. To
carry out the intent of P.D. No. 1, various Letters of Implementation
were issued from time to time. It was in the course of this
reorganization that Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972
was issued for the purpose of reorganizing certain agencies in the
Department of Justice. One such agency was the Anti-Dummy Board which
was abolished by the aforesaid LOI, to wit:
"Anti-Dummy Board
"1. The investigation function of
the Anti-Dummy Board shall be absorbed by the National Bureau of
Investigation. and its prosecution function by the Prosecution Staff
in the Department of Justice and the various Provincial and City
Fiscals. Its corresponding appropriation, records, equipment,
property, and subordinate personnel are transferred to the National
Bureau of Investigation and the Prosecution Staff in the Department
of justice.
"2. The services of the present
members of the Anti-Dummy Board are hereby terminated.
"3. The Anti-Dummy Board shall
cease to exist as of the date hereof .
"Done in the City of Manila, this
29th day of September in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-two." (emphasis supplied).
Later, P.D. No. 1275 was issued which
reorganized the entire prosecution system of the government with the
creation of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) under the
supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice, tasked with the
investigation and prosecution of all violations of penal laws,
including violation of C.A. No. 108, the Anti-Dummy Law.
In his Comment on the petition,
respondent judge insists that the dismissal of the case is supported
by the law and existing jurisprudence. Inasmuch as the City
Prosecutor relied mainly on LOI No. 2, which according to respondent
judge, is not even a law, the Anti-Dummy Board cannot be considered
as having been effectively abolished.
We reverse.
The error committed by respondent judge
in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the light of P.D. No. 1,
LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the
Anti-Dummy Board could not have been expressed more clearly than in
the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto
Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to
Quash, a mere perusal of the text of LOI No. 2 would have immediately
apprised the respondent judge of the fact that LOI No. 2 was issued
in implementation of P.D. No. 1. Paragraph 1 of LOI No. 2 reads:
"Pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 1, dated September 23, 1972, Reorganizing the Executive Branch of
the National Government, the following agencies of the Department of
Justice are hereby reorganized or activated in accordance with the
applicable provisions of the Integrated Reorganization Plan and the
following instructions: . . . (emphasis supplied).
Obviously, respondent judge did not
even bother to read the text of the cited LOI; otherwise, he would
have readily acknowledged the validity of the argument advanced by
the prosecution. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General,
Presidential Decrees, such as P.D No. 1, issued by the former
President Marcos under his martial law powers have the same force and
effect as the laws enacted by Congress. As held by the Supreme Court
in the case of Aquino vs. Comelec, (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated,
issued, or done by the former President are part of the law of the
land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless
modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders,
decrees, instructions, or other acts of the President. LOI No. 2 is
one such legal order issued by former President Marcos in the
exercise of his martial law powers to implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch
as neither P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No. 2 has been expressly or impliedly
revised, revoked, or repealed, both continue to have the force and
effect of law. (Rollo, pp. 7-8).
Indeed, Section 3, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution explicitly ordains:
"Sec. 3. All existing laws,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions,
and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution
shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked."
But even more glaring than respondent
judge's utter inexcusable neglect to check the citations of the
prosecution is the mistaken belief that the duty to inform the court
on the applicable law to a particular case devolves solely upon the
prosecution or whoever may be the advocate before the court.
Respondent judge should be reminded that courts are duty bound to
take judicial notice of all the laws of the land (Sec. 1, Rule 129
Rules of Court). Being the trier of facts, judges are presumed to be
well-informed of the existing laws, recent enactments and
jurisprudence, in keeping with their sworn duty as members of the bar
(and bench) to keep abreast of legal developments. As provided in the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
"CANON 5 — A lawyer shall keep
abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal
education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law
schools as well as in the practical training of law students and
assist in disseminating information regarding the law and
jurisprudence.
"CANON 6 — These canons shall
apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official tasks."
The Court is fully aware that not every
error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his duties is
subject to censure. But where, as in the present case, the error
could have been entirely avoided were it not for public respondent's
irresponsibility in the performance of his duties, it is but proper
that respondent judge be reprimanded and his order of dismissal set
aside for grave ignorance of the law. For, respondent judge's error
is not a simple error in judgment but one amounting to gross
ignorance of the law which could easily undermine the public's
perception of the court's competence.
The responsibility to keep abreast with
the changes in the law espoused in Canon 5 above is applicable with
equal force to counsel for private respondents, Atty. Elvira T.
Bermejo who first raised the issue at hand before the trial court. By
insisting upon the authority of an already abolished Anti-Dummy
Board, counsel displayed blatant irresponsibility, not to mention
ignorance of the law. She should be reminded that "The law, (it
is not to be forgotten), is a progressive science. There is less than
full compliance with the demands of professional competence, if a
member of a bar does not keep himself abreast of the trend of
authoritative pronouncement" (Bautista v. Rebueno, 81 SCRA 535
[1978], underscoring supplied).
Equally deplorable is the terse
half-paged pleading entitled Comment filed in behalf of private
respondents by the same counsel Atty. Elvira T. Bermejo, before this
Court, wherein she alleges:
"1. That private respondents ARNE
STROM AND GRACE REYES was (sic) properly represented by the
undersigned attorney;
"2. That private respondents ARNE
STROM AND GRACE REYES has (sic) nothing to do with the decision of
HON. EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR..
"WHEREFORE, upon premises
considered it is most respectfully prayed of this Court that said
certiorari (sic) be dismissed." (Rollo, p. 33)
It need not be emphasized that the
order of dismissal of the criminal case against private respondents
arose out of the resolution of the Motion to Quash/Dismiss filed by
private respondents themselves, through counsel Bermejo, on the
ground of lack of authority of the City Fiscal to prosecute. In other
words, such dismissal was not ordered by, respondent judge motu
proprio but rather, as prayed for by, and on motion of private
respondents through said counsel. It is quite disturbing, therefore,
for counsel to brazenly deny before this Court that private
respondents had "nothing to do" with the assailed
resolution, the issuance of which was based on their very own
pleading.
Moreover, counsel did not even bother
to defend the position of private respondents before this Court by
restating in the Comment, their arguments before the trial court,
being content instead with the short allegations aforequoted. These
acts are indicative of counsel's incompetence and lack of respect
which, this Court cannot countenance.
Undoubtedly, counsel for private
respondents failed to observe the responsibility imposed upon members
of the bar to keep abreast with the developments of the law under
Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as to
exercise candor, fairness and good faith before the court as
prescribed by Canon 10 of the same Code, for which omissions, she
should likewise be reprimanded.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
order of respondent judge dated March 18, 1994 dismissing Criminal
Case No. 11529 is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE and the aforesaid
criminal case is REINSTATED. Respondent judge is hereby REPRIMANDED
AND FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or a similar
offense shall merit serious consequences. Atty. Elvira T. Bermejo is
likewise REPRIMANDED AND FINED P10,000.00 for ignorance of the law
and for her failure to observe candor, fairness and good faith before
this Court, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or a
similar offense will be dealt with more severely by this Court. Let a
copy of this decision be spread on the personal records of Judge
Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. and Atty. Elvira T. Bermejo.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.